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COMMENTS
INCOME TAXATION OF MINERAL SHARING
ARRANGEMENTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF BONUS
TREATMENT FOR CASH PAID TO THE TRANSFEROR
This article concerns the federal income taxation of cash
payments in the context of mineral property sharing arrangements.' Specifically, the article covers the uncertain tax
status of unfettered cash paid to a transferor of mineral rights
in sharing arrangements other than traditional leases.
In a traditional lease situation, up-front cash paid unconditionally to the lessor constitutes a "bonus" and for tax purposes receives special treatment. As it will be seen, bonus tax
treatment is generally undesirable from the lessee's viewpoint,
and often from the lessor's viewpoint as well. 2 This may create
a dilemma where parties to a contemplated mineral transaction wish to avoid these tax consequences but otherwise find
the lease form suitable to their needs.
Apparently, it has been widely assumed that bonus treatment applies in traditional leases and nowhere else. If this
were so, it would be possible to obviate all possibility of bonus
treatment by structuring a sharing arrangement to avoid one
or more traditional lease features. In many cases the sharing
arrangement could be tailored to retain those lease
characteristics desired by the parties while doing away with
the undesired tax consequences. In other words, in relation to
the dilemma just described, the parties could "have their cake
and eat it too."
However, in several unsettling cases, taxpayers have been
disappointed in their efforts to avoid bonus treatment by
departing slightly from traditional lease models. In these
cases, the courts treated the transactions as leases anyway,
and applied bonus tax treatment. The cases may imply the appropriateness of bonus treatment for cash payments in a wide
variety of sharing arrangements; very little contrary authority
exists to restrict this spill-over from the taxation of traditional
Copyright© 1982 by the University of Wyoming.

1. Coal and iron ore transactions are beyond the scope of this article because of their special
treatment under I.R.C. S 631(c).
2. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text infra.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 3

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV1I

leases. As a result, parties to a contemplated sharing arrangement undertake a measure of insecurity in providing for an unconditioned cash payment to the transferor. To plan the transaction as effectively as possible for their tax purposes, they
need to know the potential for bonus treatment and the factors
relevant to its avoidance. With a view to this need, the present
article will detail the principles and authorities involved and offer theoretical analysis of the problem.
DEFINITION OF SHARING ARRANGEMENT; EXAMPLES

A sharing arrangement may be defined as "a transaction
wherein one party makes a contribution to the acquisition, exploration, or development of a mineral property and receives
as consideration an interest in the property to which the contribution is made." 3 This basic sharing formula may be cast in
a number of forms. For example, all of the following transactions are sharing arrangements:
(1) R, owner of a mineral property, transfers all of the
operating rights in the property to E, reserving a royalty and obtaining a promise from E to develop the property.
(2) R transfers the entire operating rights to E, providing that E will develop the property and recoup his
development costs from production, whereupon a
percentage of the operating rights will revert to R.
(3) R transfers a percentage of operating rights to E in
return for E's agreement to develop the property;
however, R also gives E a production payment out of
R's retained interest, to repay E for a share of the
development costs.
(4) R transfers a percentage of operating rights to E in
return for E's agreement to develop the property, and
also assigns to E all production from the property until
E has recouped his costs, after which the parties share
production in accordance with their interests.
(5) R transfers a percentage of operating or nonoperating rights to E in consideration for a cash payment which R pledges to the development of the
property.
3. BURKE & BOWHAY. INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss1/3

7.01 (1980).
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(6) R transfers a percentage of operating rights to E in
return for E's agreement to hire R as a mining or drilling contractor to develop the property.
Example (1) above is a "lease;" examples (2), (3) and (4) are
"carrying arrangements;" (5) is a "pledged funds" transaction; and (6) is a "turnkey" arrangement. 4 Throughout the remainder of this article, these examples will be referred to as
representative of the various sharing arrangements discussed.
Despite the differences of form, each of these sharing arrangements accomplishes substantially the same result: 1) the
transferee makes a contribution to the acquisition, exploration
or development of a mineral property, and 2) he receives an interest in the property to which the contribution is made.
SHARING ARRANGEMENT AS NON-TAXABLE EVENT

According to the Revenue Service's ruling in G.C.M.
22730,r the formation of a sharing arrangement is not a taxable event because it involves no sale or exchange. Rather, the
owner of the mineral property allows the transferee to make a
capital investment in that property, thereby expanding the
pool of capital which it represents. The resultant production
accruing to the transferee derives entirely from his own investment. And, even though transferee acquires a capital interest in the property, the transferor does not part with one,
because transferor's interest, now partially or wholly relieved
of the cost and risk of development, is worth exactly what it
was worth before the transaction. 6
A sharing arrangement may thus be distinguished from
any transaction in which transferee makes no capital investment in the property. For example, if transferor gives
transferee a fractional interest in the mineral property in
return for an unconditioned cash consideration alone, the
whole cash payment is taxable sale proceeds.7 This result
follows from the rationale of G.C.M. 22730.8 Since the money
is not pledged to the acquisition, exploration or development of
4. See MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, TAXATION OF MINING OPERATIONS, ch. 9 (1981).

5.
6.
7.
8.

G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214.
Id. at 216-18.
Vern W. Bailey, 21 T.C. 678 (1954); Rawco, Inc., 37 B.T.A. 128 (1938).
G.C.M. 22730, supra note 5.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 3

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

the mineral property received by the transferee, transferor's
interest remains burdened by those costs as it was before the
transaction. Therefore, transferor's interest must be worth
less by the amount of property transferred, and transferor has
thus parted with a capital asset in exchange for the cash, i.e., a
sale has occurred.
In sharing arrangements like example (5) above, transferree's capital investment consists of a cash payment to
transferor which is pledged to development of the property.
Here, the cash payment is non-taxable to the extent it is actually applied according to the pledge. 9 In this regard it is important that the funds be pledged to pre-production costs such as
acquisition, exploration or development. Cash dedicated only
to the operation of a producing property does not qualify as a
non-taxable contribution to capital. 10 This limitation is compatible with the G.C.M. 22730 rationale; a contribution to the
operation of a property does not relieve the cost or, especially,
the risk of developing the property in the first place.
UNCONDITIONED CASH PAYMENT TO TRANSFEROR

In the context of a sharing arrangement, an unconditioned
cash payment to transferor could arise in several ways. For example, the parties might provide for an outright cash payment
as an additional consideration to transferor for entering into
the transaction. Or, in a "pledged funds" transaction (example
(5)) the parties might provide that transferor may keep any excess of the funds over the amount actually used in the acquisition, exploration or development of the property. Similarly, in
a "turnkey" arrangement (example (6)), the amount paid to
hire transferor as a mining or drilling contractor may exceed
the reasonable costs of mining or drilling so that in effect
transferor has received an excess cash payment.
In any of these cases transferor ends up with surplus cash
not subject to any conditions or restrictions. This result then
poses the question of how the parties should treat the excess
cash payment for tax purposes. Regarding the traditional lease
9. Rawco, Inc., supra note 7; Trans California Oil Co., 37 B.T.A. 119 (1938), nonacq., 1942-1
C.B. 30.
10. James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964); Rev.
Rul. 74-549, 1974-2 C.B. 186; Treas. Reg. S 1.636-1(bXl) (1973).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss1/3
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(example (1)) the question is settled in favor of the special
treatment for lease bonuses, which is described under the next
heading. In the context of other sharing arrangements,
however, the treatment is uncertain. Two alternatives appear
most logical: 1) treat the cash as proceeds of a sale, or 2) treat
the transaction as a lease, and the cash as a lease bonus. These
possibilities will be considered in detail below, following the
review of lease/bonus treatment in the next section.
UNCONDITIONED CASH PAYMENT IN LEASE TRANSACTION

As previously indicated, an unconditioned lump sum paid
to a lessor at the inception of a lease constitutes a "bonus.""
The peculiar but now established mode of taxing bonus income
originated in the United States Supreme Court case of Burnet
v. Harmel.'2 There the Court denied the benefits of the capital
gains deduction to the recipients of a lease bonus, for two main
reasons.
First, the Court said that by enacting the capital gains provisions, Congress intended to relieve taxpayers of the tremendous tax burdens incidental to the conversion of capital assets.
However, the Court found this policy inapplicable to the oil and
gas lease because the lessor's gains on the transaction would
be spread out over the term of the lease.1 3 In this regard, the
Court noted that "[t]he payment of an initial bonus alters the
character of the transaction no more than an unusually large
rental for the first year alters the character of any other
lease." 14
Second, the Court distinguished a mineral lease from an
ordinary sale by analogizing the mining or drilling operation to
"a manufacturing business carried on by the use of the soil, to
which the passing of title of the minerals is but an incident... ."1 The Court held that the lessor realized ordinary income on receipt of the bonus, but could take the depletion
deduction on that income. 16
11. MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, supra note 4, S 3.0211].
12. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
13. Id. at 106.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 107.
16. Id. at 111-12.
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In later cases, the Supreme Court has elaborated upon the
Burnet v. Harmel view of bonus income. In Palmerv. Bender 17
the Court stated: "The bonus received [is] a return pro tanto of
the [lessor's] capital investment in the oil, in anticipation of its
extraction, resulting in a corresponding diminution in the unit
depletion allowance upon the royalty oil as produced."' 18 This
language makes explicit the notion implicit in Burnet v.
Harmel that the bonus is in substance an advance payment on
what would otherwise be royalty income to the transferor. The
Court confirmed this in Herring v. Commissioner,19 finding
that "[a] bonus is not proceeds from the sale of property, but
payment in advance for oil and gas to be extracted, and is
therefore taxable income. As such it is part of the 'gross income from the property.' "20
In G.C.M. 22730,21 the Revenue Service attempted to
reconcile the Supreme Court's characterization of bonus with
the general theory of sharing arrangements, as follows:
A cash bonus . . . is not a division of products or proceeds therefrom. Nor, as already noted, does it represent proceeds from the sale of a capital asset....
As the mineral in place is a reservoir of the capital investments of the parties returnable through the depletion allowance, and as the bonus payment results in a
reduction in the lessor's capital investment to the extent of the depletion allowable thereon, it follows that
such payment is a contribution by the lessee to such
reservoir of capital investments which is substituted for
the capital thereby withdrawn by the lessor. Such shifting of capital investment is attended by a corresponding
shift in the value of the respective capital interests or
share rights of the parties. That is, a bonus payment
diminishes the value of the lessor's mineral interest by
reducing his royalty share in future production. The
depletion allowance on his bonus income is designed to
compensate him for such diminution in value of his interest thereby sustained. Correspondingly, the bonus
payment enhances the value of the lessee's interest by
17. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
18. Id. at 559.
19. 293 U.S. 322 (1934).
20. Id. at 324.
21. G.C.M. 22730, supra note 5.
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giving him a larger share of the minerals produced, or
the proceeds
therefrom, by reason of his bonus invest22
ment.
This rationale is paradoxical; it seems to say that although the
lessee acquires a greater interest in the minerals by paying
transferor a bonus, no sale or exchange occurs. This is made
possible by a fictional "shifting" in the shared "reservoir of
capital investments." However, in the same ruling the Service
muddies the water by suggesting that a similar rationale applies in a "sale" of a mineral interest:
A cash payment representing proceeds from the sale of
an economic interest also accomplishes a substitution of
payor invested capital for payee invested capital. The
payee in such a case realizes a capital gain or loss
measured by the difference between cost allocable to
the interest sold and the proceeds received.23
Apparently the "shifting of capital investments" theory applies whether the cash payment is a lease bonus or simply the
proceeds from a sale. If so, the theory does not help to justify
the distinction between bonus and sales treatment, although it
does have the advantage of leaving room for both possibilities
consistent with the underlying theory of sharing arrangements.
The Supreme Court's characterization of bonus income has
resulted in a distortion, for tax purposes, of the economic reality of the transaction. Since a bonus is never recouped from
production, 24 the depletion allowed on it is in effect a depletion
unrelated to extraction. If the parties to the lease could continue to take full depletion on all subsequent production
throughout the life of the lease, the total depletion allowed
would necessarily exceed the amount of depletion attributable
to production. To avoid this gratuitous depletion allowance,
the regulations provide for a compensating reduction in deple25
tion allowed to the lessee upon production.
The lessee's tax treatment of the bonus payment may be
summarized as follows:
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 218.
See MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, supra note 4, SS 3.02[1], 3.03[31a].
Treas. Reg. SS1.612-3(aX3), 1.612-2(cX5Xii), T.D. 6446, 1960-1 C.B. 208.
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1) Lessee must allocate a specific portion of the bonus to
each tax year, and exclude that amount from his base
for depletion in that year.
2) He capitalizes the amount of the bonus payment into
his basis for the mineral property acquired in the lease.
3) He does not deduct any part of2 6the bonus payment
from his Section 61 gross income.
This summary shows the undesirability of a bonus payment from the lessee's viewpoint. First, lessee loses the depletion allowance on a certain portion of production each year,
without a corresponding reduction in Section 61 gross income.
Second, he gets no benefit from the increase in basis, except in
the rare case when he uses cost depletion because it exceeds
statutory ("percentage") depletion.2 7
From the lessor's viewpoint, the tax treatment of bonus as
depletable ordinary income may or may not be undesirable.
For example, if the cash could be treated as sale proceeds, it
might qualify for the sixty percent capital gains deduction in
lessor's hands. 28 The maximum deduction under statutory
depletion is twenty-two percent;2 9 obviously, a sale
characterization could save lessor a lot of tax dollars. In some
instances, though, a lessor might not be able to get any capital
gains benefit on the sale. For example, this might be the case if
lessor's gain would be short term, or if lessor were a dealer in
the property. 30 Then lessor would probably be happy with the
depletion deduction, although given a high enough basis in the
transferred property he might still prefer sale treatment.
NON-LEASE SHARING ARRANGEMENTS;
CASH PAYMENT AS SALE PROCEEDS

If a non-lease sharing arrangement provides for an unconditioned cash payment to the transferor, one might reasonably
conclude that the cash should be treated as taxable sale proceeds. This conclusion comports with the general sharing
26. I.R.C. S 61. For a full computational treatment of bonus payments, see MAXFIELD &
HOUGHTON, supra note 4, ch. 3; BURKE & BOWHAY, supra note 3, ch. 4.
27. See generally MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, supra note 4, ch. 2; BURKE & BOWHAY, supra
note 3, ch. 8.
28. I.R.C. S 1202; see MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, supra note 4, S 8.02.
29. I.R.C. S 613.
30. See I.R.C. S 1202,1221, 1222.
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theory discussed above: 3 1 the receipt of excess cash by the
transferor would seem to indicate that an extra portion of
transferor's mineral interest is flowing to transferee, beyond
the interest transferee acquires by assumption of some or all of
the development burden. In other words transferor's interest
in the property diminishes in value by an increment exchanged
to transferee for cash. Under this view the transaction is divided into parts: 1) a non-taxable sharing arrangement as to a certain extent of the mineral interest transferred, and 2) a sale as
to the rest.32 The sale portion then merits the same treatment
83
given to a transfer of minerals for unfettered cash alone.
In spite of the apparent logic of the above rationale, there
is little authority to support it. And, the rationale is rendered
less persuasive by its repudiation in the lease context, because
it is as appropriate to leases as it is to other forms of sharing.
Two cases from the Ninth Circuit suggest sales treatmcnt
for excess cash paid to the transferor in "pledged funds" sharing arrangements (example (5)). These cases, Rogan v. Blue
Ridge Oil Co., 34 and United States v. Knox-Powell-Stockton
Co.," involved essentially the same facts: in each case the
owner of mineral rights transferred fractional interests in production in exchange for funds which were not pledged to
development but were in fact partially expended in development. While such a transaction would not normally constitute
a sharing arrangement because of the unpledged funds, 36 the
court explicitly found an implied pledge in Rogan,37 and may
have assumed the same in the companion case. The court held
that the excess of funds over the cost of drilling was income to
the transferor. In so holding, the court seemed to assume that
the transactions involved were "sales" of the fractional interests, although in neither case did the court address the issue
explicitly, and in neither was there any mention of capital gain
treatment as opposed to bonus treatment. Still, these cases
might serve as some authority for sales treatment of an excess
cash payment to transferor in a sharing arrangement involv31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
BURKE & BOWHAY, supra note 3, at 7.06.
See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
83 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 574 (1937).
83 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1937).
See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
Rogan v. Blue Ridge Oil Co., supra note 34, at 422.
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ing pledged funds, like example (5) above. To the extent the
remaining examples could be analogized to this type of transaction, sale treatment might follow, except of course in the
first example, which is a lease.
The Tax Court case of Charles M. Bernuth,38 affirmed by
the Second Circuit, involved an excess cash payment
analogous to the surplus of pledged funds just discussed. The
transaction was a "turnkey" arrangement similar to example
(6). In Bernuth, the taxpayers acquired fractional working interests in a mineral property as part of a "package deal;" as
part of the deal, the taxpayers participated in the development
of the property under a contract by which the transferor
agreed to drill wells for a fixed price. The question in the case
was the extent to which the taxpayers could deduct the contract fee as intangible drilling and development costs. The
court agreed with the Commissioner that only a certain portion of the fee represented a reasonable cost for drilling the
wells. The balance of the cash payment was denominated
"capital expenditures to acquire interests in the oil wells in
question.' 39 While this characterization equally suits bonus
and sale proceeds, the Commissioner did not argue for bonus
treatment, and there is no indication that bonus treatment was
accorded. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit treated the overall deal as a "purchase" of a package, apparently viewing the "capital expenditures" as sale money.

Where, as in Bernuth, the parties each bear a full share of
development and operating costs, in proportion to their working interests, it may be argued that sale classification is the
only possibility, because the sharing theory of G.C.M. 22730
does not apply. Even though the total development cost to
transferor is reduced by the transfer, his retained interest
must be worth less as a result. For example, if transferor's
interest is originally worth X dollars subject to the total costs,

a retained

1/3

interest subject to 1/3 of the costs must be worth

1/3

* X dollars. And, transferor must part with a capital asset in
giving up the proportionately burdened 2/3 interest. Where he
38. 57 T.C. 225 (1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 234.
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as in Bernuth, the transaction must
receives cash in return,
40
constitute a sale.
The lack of any discussion of bonus treatment in the above
cases may reflect the assumption that bonus treatment applies
in traditional leases and nowhere else. However, the cases
discussed under the next heading indicate that it may apply in
a much wider variety of transactions.
MARGINAL SALE/LEASE CASES

A number of cases have resulted in bonus treatment for
cash payments in transactions departing slightly from the
traditional lease model illustrated in example (1) above. In
example (1) the transferee bore all of the costs and risks incident to development and operation, whereas in these marginal
cases, some of the costs and risks were retained by the
transferor. Allowing sales treatment here would open the door
to converting bonus into sale proceeds by the simple expedient
of allocating some costs to the transferor. However, in each of
the cases to be discussed, the court held that the transaction
was in substance a lease and treated the cash payment as a
bonus. This expansion of the scope of bonus treatment indicates that any sharing arrangement which is substantially
equivalent to a lease may be treated as such. The question,
then, is what factors will determine whether a given sharing
transaction is deemed a lease or a sale.
In the Tax Court case of HaroldE. Jahn,41 affirmed by the
Sixth Circuit, the taxpayers transferred a 3/8 interest in oil
and gas, retaining 5/8. Transferee agreed to undertake the
development of the property, but the taxpayers retained an
obligation to pay 5/8 of the cost of operating completed wells.
In addition, transferee paid the taxpayers a lump sum consideration. The issue in the case was whether the lump sum
was a lease bonus or the proceeds from an outright sale. The
Tax Court called the transaction a lease and treated the cash
payment as a bonus, relying for its decision on certain formal
aspects of the conveyance (e.g., the form of the granting
40. In Rogan v. Blue Ridge Oil Co., supra note 34, and United States v. Knox-PowellStockton Co., supra note 35, the facts are unclear as to whether the transferors bore any
costs. Thus it remains an open question whether the cases stand for any broader application of sale treatment than the Bernuth case. See note 42 and accompanying text infra.
41. 58 T.C. 452 (1972), affd, 475 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973).
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clause), and, more importantly, on the location of the development burden.
The court in Jahn did not enunciate a test for
distinguishing between leases and sales. However, discounting
the formal elements relied on and using the location of the
development burden as the test, one might conclude that Jahn
requires bonus treatment for cash payments in any sharing
arrangement wherein transferee relieved transferor's retained interest of the development burden. This would include any
"carried" arrangement, such as, for instance, any of examples
(2), (3), and (4) above, because transferee, in advancing costs
subject to recoupment only upon production, shoulders the
entire risk that production may never occur. Also, bonus treatment would follow from sharing arrangements like examples
(5) and (6), provided that the transferee undertook the entire
development cost. Perhaps, then, sale treatment would be appropriate where the transferor retained a proportionate part,
or at least some portion, of the risk and expense of development. This result would be consonant with Bernuth,42 where
the transferor had participated in the drilling costs, and the
court apparently treated the excess cash payment as the "purchase" of an interest.
In Westates Petroleum Co., 43 the Tax Court reached a
result similar to the Jahn result. In Westates, the transferor,
owner of certain oil and gas leases, gave the transferee an
option to acquire a 75% interest. Transferee paid a lump sum
consideration and agreed to bear the cost of exploration and
the drilling of a test well. If the first well produced oil or gas,
transferor was to pay 25% of pumping equipment and
operating costs and receive 25% of production. If the well
proved dry, the transferee could either reassign his interest to
transferor or drill a second well. If this second well was productive, the transferee was to continue developing the property. Transferor agreed to pay 25% of the cost of drilling the
42. See note 38 and accompanying text supra. However the JoAn case may well be inconsistent with Rogan v. Blue Ridge Oil Co., supra note 34, and United States v. Knox-Powell-

Stockton Co., supra note 35, depending on one's construction of the facts in those two
cases. If the transferees there bore all of the drilling costs, Jahn would indicate lease
treatment, but the Ninth Circuit apparently viewed the transactions as sales. As authority counter to JaAn, the cases are unpersuasive because 1) the court did not address the
sale/lease issue, and 2) the facts are equivocal as to whether or not transferees bore all of
the drilling costs.
43. 21 T.C. 35 (1953).
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second and all subsequent wells, and in return was to receive
net profits
as his share of production from these wells a ' 5%
44
interest and a 20% "carried working interest. "
Again, the issue in the case was whether the initial cash
payment constituted bonus or sale proceeds. The Tax Court
concluded that the transaction was a lease, saying that the
transferor "did not sell or otherwise dispose of its interest in
the oil and gas in place while assigning the right for a limited
time to explore and drill for the oil and gas." 45 Thus the court
treated the cash as a bonus. From the rest of the court's
opinion it is hard to discern the underlying reasoning;
however, the above-quoted language seems to indicate that the
court considered most relevant 1) the transferor's retention of
an economic interest in the property, and 2) transferee's exclusive right to explore and obligation to drill a test well. Of
these two considerations, the second must have been crucial,
since the retention of an economic interest by the transferor,
standing alone, is clearly not enough to invoke lease treatment. For example, when an owner of a mineral estate
transfers a fractional interest or carved out royalty for cash
alone, he retains an economic interest in the property; but, as
because the theory
previously noted, the transaction is a sale
46
of sharing arrangements cannot apply.
The division of risks and obligations are similar in Westates
and Jahn. Regarding the first well in Westates, the arrangement was practically identical to the Jahn arrangement:
transferee assumed the entire burden of exploration and
development, but upon production the parties shared proportionately the operating expense. In Westates the facts are not
clear regarding the second and subsequent wells. While the
parties agreed that transferee would "charge"transferor with
25% of the drilling costs, transferor was also said to have retained a 5% net profits interest and a 20% "carried working interest." 4 ' This apparently means that transferee was to pay
the out-of-pocket costs and then recoup the "charges" from
transferor's 20% share of production. After the payout of all
44. Id. at 37, 39.
45. Id. at 39.
46. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the "economic interest" concept, see generally MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, supru note 4, S 1.04.
47. Westates Petroleum Co., supra note 43, at 37.
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the carried costs, the 20% of production and a proportionate
part of subsequent operating expenses would revert to the
transferor. 48 If this interpretation is correct, the result after
the reversion is essentially the same as the Jahn transaction;
transferor bears a proportionate part of the operating costs,
while transferee has borne the risk and cost of development.
Thus in holding the transaction to constitute a lease, the
Westates case is fully in accord with Jahn.
In Campbell v. Fasken,4 9 the taxpayers transferred in-

terests in a large number of tracts to several transferees. In
each transaction, the taxpayers retained a 55% fractional interest, and received a cash payment and a promise by the
transferee to drill and complete one well. Taxpayers agreed
that on completion of a producing well they would pay $25,000
as their share of the drilling cost. It was agreed that if a well
was not completed as a producer, the taxpayers would pay
55% of the costs, but not to exceed $25,000. Further, the taxpayers were to pay 20 cents per barrel as their share of
operating costs unless the price of oil dropped below $1.01 per
barrel, in which case they were to pay 55% of the operating
costs.
The case initially went to court over a dispute about the
deductibility of the taxpayers' expenses. However, on appeal,
the Commissioner argued that the transactions were actually
leases rather than sales. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit agreed with the Commissioner on this issue, relying on
the "substance over form" principle.50 The court therefore

treated the cash payments as bonus income.
Fasken repudiates, or at least modifies, the test suggested
by Jahn. In Fasken, the transferors retained not only a portion
of the operating costs, but also a substantial portion of the
development obligation. In this respect the Fasken transactions diverged more radically from a traditional lease than did
the Jahn transaction. Still, the divergences did not suffice to
save the Fasken transactions from lease treatment.
48. See generally MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, supra note 4, S 9.04[4].

49. 267 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1959).
50. See also West v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795

(1946).
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Fasken differs from Jahn in the degree to which the
transferors carried their share of operating expenses. In Jahn,
the transferor agreed to pay a full proportionate share of actual operating costs, whereas in Fasken, transferor's contribution was in practical effect limited to 20 cents per barrel. This
limited contribution might well be viewed as a formality (a simple and regular deduction from transferor's share of production), and not substantially burdening transferor's interest. In
this respect, then, the Fasken transactions diverged less from
the traditional lease than did the Jahn transaction.
It is not clear to what extent the Fasken court regarded as
significant the $25,000 per well limit on the transferor's share
of drilling costs. Practically speaking, this limitation could
have reduced considerably the risk attending a full 55%
development obligation. To the degree transferor's risk was so
reduced, it was shifted to the transferee, as it would be in a
leasing transaction. Thus the limitation tends to justify the
court's conclusion that the transaction was a lease. On the
other hand, the limitation did not wipe out transferor's
$25,000 per well gamble, which, it must be conceded, was
hardly de minimis. The implication may be that for the Fasken
court, no amount of transferor's contribution to development
would prevent a sharing arrangement from being recast as a
lease. Read more conservatively, the case holds that nothing
short of a fully proportionate contribution will prevent lease
treatment.
One commentator has suggested, in response to the
Fasken case, that the expense of development borne by
transferor can be viewed as a reduction of transferor's
economic interest in the property. 51 This constitutes a kind of
reverse version of the "shifting of capital investments" theory
discussed above. 52 The idea is to impute to the transferee the
entire assumption of the development burden, leaving
transferor with a reduced but fully unburdened interest in the
property. This rationalization of the result in Fasken is unsatisfactory because it ignores the economic significance of the
risks actually allocated to transferor. Pushing the rationaliza51. Note, Taxation: Sale of Mineral Interest:Ordinary Income or Capital Gain, 7 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 404 (1960).
52. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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tion a bit further, one might conclude that transferor's interest
is equally unburdened before the transfer-it is simply viewed
as being reduced by the total cost of development. The frivolity
of this line of reasoning should be obvious.
PRE-PRODUCTION COSTS

As noted, Jahn and Westates may imply a sale/lease test
based on the location of the development burden, regardless of
who bears the cost of operation. Fasken goes farther to find a
lease where transferor has retained a substantial, but not fully
proportionate, share of the development burden. However,
these cases say nothing about why the development burden
may be so important, or why the operational expense should be
so unimportant.
In the context of sharing arrangements generally, a
distinction may be made between pre-production expenditures
as capital in nature, and operational expenditures as noncapital in nature. It has already been seen that sharing theory
requires a contribution to pre-production costs by transferee,
because it is this assumption of pre-production risk by
transferee which expands the "pool of capital" and allows
transferee to acquire a capital interest without transferor's
having to give one up. 53 A contribution to operational expense
alone does not expand the "pool of capital." For example, if a
transferee receives a fractional interest in oil and gas in exchange for cash and his (the transferee's) promise to bear part
of the cost of operating completed wells, the transaction can
not be a sharing arrangement. The obligation to pay operating
expenses, while reducing transferee's net proceeds from production, does not serve to unburden transferor's interest at all.
Transferee has not expanded the "pool of capital," so
therefore the interest he acquires must flow from transferor in
exchange for the cash payment. In other words the transaction
must be a sale.
What if, instead, transferee assumes the entire development burden as in Jahn? Once the property has reached the
production stage, the greater part of the investment risk has
passed. At that point, the payment of a portion of operating
53. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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costs by the transferor represents simply a reduction in
transferor's net proceeds from existing production. The parties probably anticipated during negotiation the amount of this
reduction and adjusted transferor's interest upward to compensate; the net effect would be to give transferor a royalty.
The transaction then looks very much like a lease, with
transferee undertaking the entire investment risk, and
transferor taking a share of the proceeds.
If transferor retains a proportionate part of the obligation
to develop, it would be less sensible to cast his retained interest
as a royalty, because his interest remains burdened by the
possibility of no production after substantial expenditures. No
matter how the parties may have adjusted transferor's share
of production to account for his expenditures, the adjustment
will fail unless production is attained. It is clear that to the extent transferor's interest remains burdened by the preproduction risk, the sharing theory of G.C.M. 22730 does not
apply. When transferor retains a fully proportionate share of
pre-production costs, it is hard to see how the sharing theory
could apply at all; even though the total development cost to
transferor is reduced by the4 transfer, his retained interest
must be worth less, as well.5

The suggestion here is that lease treatment cannot logically be extended to a transaction wherein the parties agree to
bear pro rata the pre-production costs. As seen above, the
post-production expenses do not have the same degree of
economic significance, because they do not substantially affect
the allocation of risk between the parties. Thus in
distinguishing sales and leases, the allocation of postproduction costs between the parties might well be ignored.
BONUS TREATMENT

Where the parties have split the pre-production costs in
proportion to their interests, an unconditioned cash payment
to the transferor should not be accorded bonus treatment.
First, since the transaction does not relieve transferor's
interest of the development risk, from transferor's point of
view the transaction does not differ from any other disposition
54. See note 40 and accompanying text supra, for a discussion of the analogous situation
where transferor has also retained proportionate operating costs.
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of a capital asset. Therefore, as a practical matter, the policies
behind the capital gains deduction are as applicable here as
they are to, say, the sale of an apartment building. 55 Second,
the notion of bonus as an advance payment on production 56 is
wholly inapplicable here. Transferee has acquired his interest
through an exchange reducing transferor's interest, rather
than by assuming the obligation to develop transferor's
interest. Transferor's share of production is then completely
accounted for by his retained operating interest; therefore an
advance payment on that share of production could not logically be coming from the transferee.
It can be argued that bonus treatment is, economically
speaking, so fundamentally unsound that it should be limited
to traditional leases and nothing else. 57 Adoption of this viewpoint involves the rejection of Jahn, Westates, and Fasken as
wrongly decided because they expand the contexts in which
cash will be deemed bonus. However, if bonus treatment is
with us to stay, it should be given effect, at most, in those transactions which are substantially identical to leases. Jahn and
Westates involved transactions differing from traditional
leases only in the allocation of operating expenses; since, as
discussed above, the allocation of operating expenses lacks
real economic significance, the conclusion that the two transactions were leases seems justified.
The Fasken case is much harder to rationalize; even
though transferor's share of pre-production costs was limited
by a $25,000 ceiling, it still had substantial impact on the
economics of the transaction. Arguably, the Fasken court
should have given some effect to transferor's contribution,
perhaps by allocating part of the cash payment to bonus and
part to sales price. For example, the court might have prorated
the cash according to the percentage which transferor's actual
share of pre-production costs bore to a fully proportionate
share. Such an approach would have the advantages of 1)
allowing the parties the tax benefit of transferor's investment
in pre-production costs, and 2) still preventing the easy conversion of bonus into sale proceeds by a nominal allocation of costs
55. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
57. See MAXFIELD & HOUGHTON, supra note 4, S 3.02[2][a], 8.01, 8.03[2][c].
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to transferor. However, Fasken seems to hold that unless
transferor bears a full pro rata share of costs, all of the cash
payment will constitute bonus. In this regard, Fasken has not
been followed in any other case; perhaps it has been regarded
as an aberration in the tax law, and therefore to be ignored.
CONCLUSION

It is unclear to what extent Jahn, Westates, and Fasken
call for bonus treatment in other types of sharing
arrangements. It has been seen that in all cases there is a
sound logical basis for sale treatment. However, the supportive authority is scant. Jahn and Westates certainly indicate
that a retention of operating costs by transferor will not suffice to avoid bonus treatment. The question remains to what
degree a retention of pre-production costs will work. Fasken
suggests the solution of treating any sharing arrangement as a
lease unless transferor retains a full proportionate share of
pre-production costs. However, where transferor has retained
a lesser share, it still might be feasible to treat some of the cash
payment as sale money and some as bonus. In any event, parties desiring sale treatment will need to carefully consider all
of the above factors in planning their transaction. Unfortunately, it remains uncertain exactly how these factors may
ultimately affect the tax treatment given. The best that can be
said is that the parties undertake a certain risk when they
count on avoiding bonus treatment by resort to non-lease sharing arrangements.
JOHN R. ALEXANDER
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